

Sugar-coating over a bitter pill?

*The effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the
municipal level in the Netherlands*

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Abstract

This master thesis analyses the effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level in the Netherlands by means of a Critical Security Studies (CSS) approach. This research is of political-societal relevance since it provides more insight in the effects of national policy on the performance of municipalities. Moreover, this research will be of academic relevance as well, since it will take a closer look at the way community policing affects the role enactment of community actors, being policy makers, mayors, neighbourhood police officers and social welfare organisations, when it comes to counter terrorism in the Netherlands. Counter-radicalisation policies consist of community-focused approaches, being intercultural dialogues and trainings, and community-targeted approaches, being monitoring and law enforcement. Several Dutch municipalities state that the enactment of these policies is incorporated but also challenged, referred to as the ‘sugar-coating over a bitter pill’. This research argues that the effects of the enactment of the policies at the local level are the labelling of citizens at risk, threatening the existence of an inclusive community and decreasing the level of trust between community actors, members and national and local partners. According to this research, the effects are noticeable and diverse. Community actors are able to ventilate the importance of their role as father or mother of the community as community-focused approaches can thrive even though community-targeted approaches are added to their curriculum. Thus, community actors acknowledge that there is a bitter pill which needs to be consumed to counter radicalisation at a local level. A sugar-coating of community-focused approaches will make it easier for them to swallow.

Key words: community-focused approach; community policing; community-targeted approach; counter-radicalisation; local governance

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

Chapter 1 Introduction	5
1.1 Existing literature on local governance and counter-radicalisation	7
Chapter 2 Theories, Hypotheses and Research Design	11
2.1 Theoretical Framework	11
2.2 Hypotheses	12
2.3 Object of study	14
2.4 Data generation	14
2.5 Sources	14
2.6 Data analysis	15
2.7 Scope and limits	16
Chapter 3 Discourse of radicalisation	17
3.1 Composition of local counter-radicalisation policies	17
3.2 Assigning a deviant ‘other’	19
3.3 The production of a counter-message	19
Chapter 4 Counter-radicalisation policies: practices of inclusion and exclusion	22
4.1 The community-focused approach: striving for inclusion	22
4.2 The community-targeted approach: coping with exclusion	25
Chapter 5 The importance of trust for counter-radicalisation practices	27
5.1 Importance of trust on a local level	27
5.2 Limitations to trust	28
5.3 Trust-building and the meaning of trust on a local level	30
Chapter 6 Conclusion and discussion	35
6.1 Summary of the findings	35
6.2 Discussion and future prospects	37
References	38

List of Abbreviations

AIVD	General Intelligence and Security Services of the Netherlands
AOV	Official Public Order and Safety
CBS	Statistics Netherlands
CCV	Centre for Criminal Prevention
VNG	Association of Dutch Municipalities
OM	Public Prosecution Service
NCTV	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism

Chapter 1 Introduction

Following the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, the assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn in Hilversum in 2002, and the attack on filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004, the Netherlands has intensified its counter-terrorism practices, especially against the executives of ‘Jihadist ideology’ (Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 147). Since “a terrorist attack will always take place within a municipality”¹, it is, according to the Dutch government, necessary to integrate counter-radicalisation programs within the local policy domain. Hereby certain responsibilities and tasks regarding counter-terrorism, which were once under the authority of the state, are transferred to the local government (Juntunen & Hyvönen, 2014, p. 196; Crepaz, 2008, p. 93). This shift of counter-terrorism practices from a national to a local level has implications for the role enactment of the community actors involved, being the “totality of voluntary civic and social organisations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the structures of the state or the market” (ISD, 2010, p. 4).

The cohesion and coordination of counter-terrorism acts between institutional bodies at the national and local level has increased and intensified (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2010, p. 13). A monitor from the Research and Documentation Centre of the Prosecution of Terrorism Act shows that in 2008 nearly half (14 out of 29) of the terrorism-related criminal investigations in the Netherlands had been dealt with by a regional police force (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2010, p. 108). This is the result of processes of ‘decentralisation’, meaning the transferring of tasks which were previously under the guidance of the central state, to the municipal level, which the Dutch government initiated during the 1980s (Ewijk, 2013, p. 99). As a consequence, the role of the municipality is defined in two ways. First of all in terms of autonomy, meaning according to Ewijk (2013, p. 99): “Municipalities are autonomous with regard to municipal affairs”. Second of all in terms of ‘co-governance’, referring here to “the tasks of local governments in implementing national legislation” (Ewijk, 2013, p. 99).

From 2004 onwards, Dutch municipalities received a leading role in making sure counter-radicalisation policies were acted out, especially against Jihadism (VNG, 2014). Emphasis was placed on the responsibility of the municipalities to prevent and repress radicalisation acts linked to Jihadism (Ibid.). Currently this is done through counter-radicalisation policies which are based on the state-led program ‘Action Program Integral Radicalisation and Jihadism’, developed by the National Coordination of Terrorism and Counter-terrorism (NCTV), Ivo Opstelten, the former Dutch minister of Security and Justice, and Lodewijk Asscher, the Dutch minister of Social Affairs and Employment on August 29th 2014 (VNG, 2015).

Counter-terrorism policies in the Netherlands are characterised by a mix of reactive methods, meaning the focus lies on “bringing to justice individuals who are suspected of committing criminal offenses in regards to the law” and preventive methods, referring to “anticipating and preventing terrorist acts from happening” (Ragazzi, 2015, p. 2). Preventive methods can be divided into *community-targeted approaches*, the ‘full coercive powers of the state in obtaining information and monitoring a community’ and *community-focused approaches*, the ‘cooperations and partnerships between police and the community to control crime’ (Murray, 2005, p. 354; Spalek & McDonald, 2012, p. 20).

¹ Schoof, D. (2014). ‘We zijn niet naïef’. Viewed via <http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/achtergrond/achtergrond/we-zijn-niet-naief.9456951.lynkx>

The community-targeted and community-focused approaches are defined under the ‘Comprehensive approach’ (Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 148; Ministry of Security and Justice, 2010, p. 13). According to the Ministry of Security and Justice (2010, p. 13): “The Comprehensive approach should be considered as the basis of Dutch antiterrorism policy”.

First of all, the Comprehensive approach defines the community-focused approach as ‘a measure against violent acts, meaning the integration of problem-solving perspectives, customer service and community responsiveness as instruments to create stronger relations among local citizens’ (Murray, 2005, p. 349). These measures are acted out by the so-called *community actors*, which are according to Crawford (2008, p. 148), neighbourhood police officers, policy advisors and social welfare organisations. Second of all, the Comprehensive approach defines the community-targeted approach as “a diverse range of security actors that repress violent actors who are on the point of committing violent acts or who have already committed such acts” (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2010, p. 44).

Dutch counter-terrorism policies did not always include both community-targeted and community-focused approaches. Throughout the years, the emphasis within national counter-terrorism policies in the Netherlands was still very much focused on community-targeted measures alone. Yet, the official inclusion of the Comprehensive approach in the memorandum ‘Terrorism and the Protection of Society’ in 2003, gave room for the combination of community-focused and community-targeted measures within national and local policies. The inclusion was formally finalised in 2007 in the Dutch Action Plan ‘Polarisation and Radicalisation’. This Action Plan officially ended in 2011 because of a subsidy closure by the state. The renewed Dutch counter-radicalisation policy, called ‘Action Program Integral Radicalisation and Jihadism’, was set up in 2014 and integrated both community-targeted and community-focused measures.

However, this Action Program created new challenges for the involved community actors. Where the tasks of municipalities were once mainly based on community-focused approaches, which were seen as a major advantage to control crime, it was now decided by the state that they could also be held responsible for the enactment of community-targeted approaches. Within this approach, emphasis is put on monitoring, selective housing allocation based on criminal behaviour, the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship when activities or preparations concerning radicalisation are acted out, the prohibition of entering certain areas and hailing (VNG; 2015; Ministry of Security and Justice, 2015).

This mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures is viewed by the involved actors as both a ‘problem’ and a ‘solution’ (Spalek, 2012, p. 24). The policy measures are intertwined; incorporated but also challenged. Not only by those who counter them, but also by those who govern them. This is what Fitzgerald et al. depicts as “the sugar-coating over a bitter pill” (2002, p. 12). Although acknowledging that community policing must be incorporated to counter radicalisation, several Dutch municipalities state that they experience difficulties when it comes to dealing with these contradictory policies (VNG, 2014, p. 1). However, on the national level, the Dutch government proposes that this local approach is instead a ‘solution’ and necessary to be able to counter radicalisation (NCTV, 2014c, p. 8). Therefore, different actors and institutions assign different meanings to this counter-terrorism approach. Thus, “*tensions are, therefore, perhaps inevitable*” (Spalek & McDonald, 2012, p. 24). Using a Critical Security Studies (CSS) approach, this Master thesis aims to answer the following research question: *What are the effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level in the Netherlands?*

1.1 Existing literature on local governance and counter-radicalisation

The way crime and safety is governed has changed tremendously in Europe and the United States since the 1970s (Crawford, 2009, p. 15). Where the institutional foundations of crime control were once built on liberal penal principles and national institutions of police, prosecution, courts and prisons, another context emerged where welfare and security increasingly overlap (Garland, 2002, p. 127). Although the advocacy for crime prevention already took place in the eighteenth century, 'preventive partnerships' are considered to be a defining attribute of contemporary crime control (Crawford, 2009, p. 16).

Several authors have discussed the reasons behind this shift in crime control. Where O'Malley proclaims it to be a rise of the narrative of risk and Johnston and Shearing (as cited by Crawford, 2009, p. 15) state that it is due to a new era of 'networked governance', Garland (2001) and Crawford (2009) argue that the merging of welfare and security represents a 'major shift in paradigm'.

According to Crawford (2009, p. 15), Europe has witnessed for the past quarter of a century an 'epistemological break', where crime prevention and community safety have been one of the major innovations in crime control. As a result, a 'whole new infrastructure of policies' has been set up in which community-focused measures and community partnerships are central, thus differing from earlier forms of crime reduction, such as punishment and prosecutions (Crawford, 2009, p. 16). Garland (2001, p. 171) explains that alongside policing and penalty a 'third governmental sector' has emerged, in which crime prevention organisations, public - private partnerships, community policing arrangements, and multi-agency working practices are linked together (Ibid.). This is what Garland calls the shift from 'penal welfarism' to a 'dual system of policy' (as cited by Cochrane & Talbot, 2008, p. 12). This 'dual system of policy' differs from penal welfarism in that it combines *punitive segregation*, meaning an 'increase in control', and *preventive partnership*, which can be described as the 'withdrawal of centralised control in favour of working to control crime through community partnerships and a new emphasis on crime prevention and rehabilitation' (Garland, 2001, p. 23).

Hughes (2004, p. 172), on the other hand, believes that the overlap of security and welfare is due to a 'crisis of the criminal justice system'. Causes for this crisis were an increasing rate of recorded crimes, an overload combined with a crisis of efficiency, a growing awareness of extensive social and economic costs of crime and the increasing recognition that formal processes of criminal justice only have a limited effect on controlling crime (Ibid.). As a response, *primary situational crime prevention*, meaning 'designing out' crime and opportunity reduction, and *social crime prevention and community safety*, which is focused on community development measures, came to the fore. According to Hughes (2004, p. 172), both approaches are considered to be 'less damaging and more effective' than traditional justice approaches.

Muncie (2006, p. 2) argues that due to criticism of welfare state intervention for delivering services from the top-down, more emphasis is put on individual responsibility, active citizenship and governing at a distance. As a result, the merging of security and welfare took place. Furthermore, Muncie (2006, p. 2) stipulates that this development of neoliberal forms of management is accompanied by processes of globalisation, in which the 'zombie and constraining' categories of welfare interventionism, such as nation and class, are dead (Ray, 2007, p. 172; Hughes, 2004, p. 180). In return, this has led to an increase in homogenisation of certain policies, although still effected by local enclaves, and a decrease of welfare protection and social inclusion (Muncie, 2006, p. 2).

Mooney and Neal (2009) and Muncie (2006) describe the rise of the importance of 'community' as a reason for the combination of security and welfare. This because of the fact that a community is most often referred to as a social fabrication of 'good' social relations, which involve care, trust and social bonds, therefore able to effectively control crime (Mooney & Neal, 2009, p. 2). However, they also state that the concept of community has a high level of 'emotional resonance', indicating that the concept of community is also known for its negative attributes, such as discrimination and constraining individual freedom (Ibid.).

To conclude, there are several reasons behind the shift in crime control. Where Garland (2001) and Crawford (2009) see it as a 'paradigm shift' from penal-welfarism to a dual system of policy, Hughes (2004) describes it as a result of a 'crisis of the criminal justice system'. Muncie (2006) argues that criticisms towards welfare state intervention has led to a bottom-up approach to control crime. Last but not least, Mooney and Neal (2009) focus on the importance of community in the contemporary fight against crime. It can thus be concluded from the literature that traditional forms of crime control are diminishing and that the role of civil society is increasingly seen as the more privileged site of governance to control contemporary crime.

The overlap of security and welfare measures, in which community-targeted approaches are combined with community-focused approaches, has resulted in a diverse range of community partnerships and programs aimed to control crime on the local level, all with different implications and opinions in terms of enactment and success. Murray (2005, p. 347) for example, agrees with this mixture of policy measures, since it would reinforce social cohesion when everybody 'is in it together': "a community relationship that is built on trust and mutual respect is much more likely to give early warning about terrorists attacks" (2005, p. 359). Also Briggs, Fieschi and Lownbrough and Sliwinski (2006; p. 15; 2012, p. 297) are in favour of using community-police measures to control crime. First of all, they argue that state-led governments are 'immobile' since they are usually understaffed and underinvested (Ibid.). Handing over some of the responsibilities to civil society would shift some of the burden. Second, it would strengthen the rise of a 'self-policing society', where the community can pick up signs of community members who tend to lean towards crime (Ibid.). Also, community-police relations would produce more collaborative populations; the involvement of citizens could bring those same citizens closer to the state. Third, the belief that 'we are all in this together' could make it easier for the state-led governments to operate and fulfil their duties along the lines of 'traditional' counter-terrorism approaches. Finally, they argue that traditional crime control measures are rather expensive (2006, p. 15; 2012, p. 297). Although community-police relations could not eradicate all costs, they could nevertheless 'mitigate them to some extent'.

Guzman (2002) and Hughes (2004) are critical towards community policing. Guzman declares that solely focusing on community policing, designed to increase trust and coherence within a society, will not prove to serve worthwhile to counter terrorism, since "one cannot reason with terrorists because they are constantly deploying the practice of misleading" (2002, p. 11). Vesting time and effort in building trust would therefore prove to be ineffective. Hughes (2004, p. 177) also questions whether the local enactment of counter-terrorism is effective, since it could lead to 'disappointing and chaotic outcomes of previous multi-agency partnerships' and 'inequalities of power, influence and knowledge between the different agencies, their positions and the institutions in which they once were inhabited'.

To conclude, the current literature presents different opinions about the effectiveness of this dual system of policy. Where Murray (2005), Briggs, Fieschi and Lownsborough (2006) and Sliwinski (2012) are all in favour of community-police relations to counter crime, Guzman (2002) and Hughes (2004) are skeptical towards the role of community in controlling crime.

Communities in the Netherlands were for a long time rather unfamiliar with the concept of crime prevention (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009, p. 133). Crime prevention policies were formally finalised in 1985, but were mainly focused on reducing the opportunities for crime on a national level. In 1994, the Dutch government initiated security policies on the local level, which led to more responsibilities for municipalities (Ibid.). According to Van Dijk and De Waard (2009, p. 143) and Van Houdt and Schinkel (2013, p. 2), it was this process that signalled the emergence of a pragmatic and a people-centred approach of Dutch crime prevention, characterised by the ‘conjoint intensification of both social-welfare and penal interventions’.

A current example of this ‘conjoint intensification’ is the ‘Action Program Integral Approach Radicalisation and Jihadism’ developed in 2014 and aimed at countering the jihadist movement. Within this approach, both community-focused and community targeted approaches are underlined. The community-focused approach refers to “a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic measures specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists” (Schmid, 2013, p. 50). These packages can include interfaith meetings, professional development seminars, development of tools/measures to better enable teachers and public authorities to address radical and negative opinions, establishment of a help desk to which public authorities and public actors can turn to for information on radicalisation or to ‘report’ a possible suspect, the creation of a mentoring system for young people to establish face-to-face dialogue and the existence of resource individuals and role models. The programs and policies are acted out by community actors, who serve as agents of social control (Crawford, 2008, p. 158). Although they do not enjoy any formal police powers, they do work together with police officers (Ibid.).

The community-targeted approach consists of monitoring public spaces, the use of surveillance, detection and law enforcement. Within this approach, emphasis is furthermore put on selective housing allocation based on criminal behaviour, the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship when activities or preparations concerning radicalisation are acted out, the prohibition of entering certain areas and hailing (VNG; 2015; Ministry of Security and Justice, 2015). Where the monitoring of public spaces and using surveillance is also acted out by the community actors, the other measures, such as the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship, are acted out by the Public Prosecution Service (OM) and the Ministry of Security and Justice (Ibid.).

In response to the Action Program, community actors expressed their concern regarding the enactment of the program on a local level (VNG, 2015). They state that “expertise in this area is scarce and limited”, and that they are “missing guidance” from the state level when it comes to implementing the Action Program (VNG, 2015). They are also concerned about the inclusion of community-targeted measures within their current policies: “The inclusion of prevention and repression is a dilemma” (VNG, 2015).

This highlights a gap in the literature. Where former research mainly focused on the effects of community policing on Muslim communities in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) (Husband

and Alam, 2011; Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011), current researchers of counter-radicalisation have not yet concentrated their efforts on the effects of counter-radicalisation policies on the role enactment of local community actors in the Netherlands. As Schmid (2011, p. 1) states ‘the effect of counter-terrorism on the role of local governance is an un-researched topic’. Also Eatwell and Goodwin (2010, p. 14) claim that “few studies bridge theoretical and empirical research on counter-terrorism with policy and practice”. This Master Thesis aims to fill this gap by answering the research question: *What are the effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level in the Netherlands?* By answering this question, this research would be of societal and academic relevance. First of all, conducting this research would be of political-societal relevance since it would provide more insights in the effects of national policy on the performance of municipalities, meaning their real-life experiences in the field. Additionally, it would be of academic relevance to take a closer look at the way community policing effects the role enactment of local actors when it comes to counter terrorism in the Netherlands.

Chapter 2 Theories, hypotheses and research design

This chapter will first of all provide an overview of the key assumptions and concepts concerning the local governance of crime. Second of all, the effects of the merging of community-focused and community-targeted approaches will be theorised. Third and lastly, an overview is presented of the way data has been gathered and analysed.

2.1 Theoretical framework

Neoliberalism, a 'system of economic ideas and policy initiatives that emphasises small government and market-based solutions to social and economic problems', has led to significant changes within the accountability and enforcement structures of community policing (Kaplan-Lyman, 2012, p. 177). Although neoliberalism is often characterised as the 'successor of penal welfarism', communitarianism succeeds neoliberalism as it provides "a rationale of governing that allows a greater amount of complexity precisely because it consists of a paradoxical set of doctrines, discourses and techniques" (Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2013, p. 493). Van Houdt and Schinkel (2013, p. 493) call this transition *neoliberal communitarianism*; the paradoxical governmental strategy that combines a focus on 'individual responsibility', 'community' and a 'selectively tough state'. This governmental rationality refers to the merging of social and security policies, which can be defined as 'placing less emphasis on social contexts, state protection and rehabilitation' and more on prescriptions of *managerialism* and *responsibilisation*, according to Rose (as cited by Muncie, 2006, p. 2) and Kaplan-Lyman (2012, p. 177). Neoliberal communitarianism could therefore serve worthwhile in analysing the community policing debate (Muncie, 2006, p. 2; Kaplan-Lyman, 2012, p. 177; Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2013, p. 1).

The concept of *managerialism* underlines "the need to develop a connected, coherent, efficient and above all cost-effective series of policies and practices" (Muncie, 2006, p. 7). Managerialism derives from the 'New Public Management' paradigm, which appeared in the United States and Canada since 1995 and stresses decentralised and performance-oriented culture in the public sector (Robert, 2005, p. 566). As Robert explains, managerialism is an 'ideology': "It is a set of values, ideas, and beliefs about the state of the world that provides justification for action" (2005, p. 566). More importantly, it presents the belief that with better management through multi-agency partnerships, social issues such as radicalisation can be solved. The process of managerialism can thus be seen as a 'mixed package' of welfare with increasing roles for the private, voluntary and informal sectors, as well as the movement outwards of tasks, duties and responsibilities from the state to other agents (Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 24). This stresses the actual break with traditional methods of public administration. It is about implementing policies that 'work', whether pragmatically or politically, in order to reach certain 'targets'.

The concept of *responsibilisation* refers to the key message that the central government does not control crime through the established institutions of prisons, police, courts and social work, but by means of non-state actors and institutions (Muncie, 2006, p. 5). All citizens therefore have a responsibility to reduce crime and increase informal social controls (Ibid.). "No longer can the state be expected to control crime on its own" (Muncie, 2006, p. 5). This way, the concept of responsibilisation consolidates with the concept of

managerialism, since responsabilisation reflects market-like conditions; “Its welfarist core is eroded; elements of the state are privatised; crime control is commodified; and active entrepreneurship replaces passivity and state dependency” (Muncie, 2006, p. 5).

2.2 Hypotheses

One could argue that counter-radicalisation policies on the municipal level are purely symbolic politics. According to Malthaner and Waldmann (as cited by Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 127), the continued movement of state intervention cannot be evaded considering the production of pressure on governments to react firmly in response to terrorist attacks. In return, governments show a tendency to formulate measures which perhaps seem inadequate or unsuited for the situation at hand. They tend to include measures against security problems or persons which are sometimes loosely connected to the current crisis. Furthermore, Muncie (2006, p. 12) claims that community policing is also clearly driven by ‘value-laden, political, institutional and economic imperatives; thus also infected by the notion of what is electorally popular. Not only could this be the result of miscalculations or overreactions, Murray Edelman (as cited by Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 128) explains that this can be understood as a form of ‘symbolic political measures’. According to this perspective, some actions have a symbolic function to show the strength of the government and restore a feeling of security and safety. Thus, the effects of this policy fabrication are symbolising social ideas and norms and the production of means of direct control. However, this research argues that there are other, deeper, effects to these policies. As a result, the following hypotheses are formulated:

- *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level are programs of remoralisation: the labelling of deviants*

The first hypothesis is based on the thinking of Muncie and his emphasis on remoralisation. The concept of *remoralisation* stresses a strengthening and deepening of national and local state interventionist programs which are based on regulating, surveillance and monitoring entire communities (Muncie, 2006, p. 15). Remoralisation therefore implicates that, because of the combination of welfare and security, local and national governments are able to focus their efforts of crime control on socially constructed entities who are in need of replacement in order to reach a certain level of moralisation (Gusfield, 1967, p. 228). This process of labelling serves as an instrument by the local and national government to “influence the allocation of resources on the local level but also to define the public norms of morality and to designate which acts violate them” (Gusfield, 1967, p. 228). This indicates a distinction of one culture versus another. For instance, the policies aimed at ‘excluding’ behaviour which aligns with jihadist ideologies, set the standard for what is considered to be ‘right’ and what is not.

Yet, setting the standard of what is right and wrong is not enough for the confirmation of the norm. Only “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”, as Thomas (as cited by Merton, 1995, p. 380) stipulates. Only when the deviant ‘others’ act upon the conceptualisation of what is ‘right’ or what is ‘wrong’, by showing repentance for instance, confirmation of the norm takes place. Therefore, based on the above-mentioned arguments, this hypothesis argues that the enactment of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level underlines the existence of socially constructed entities who are in need of replacement. These policies are therefore programs of remoralisation.

- *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level cause a feeling of inclusion or exclusion within communities*

The second hypothesis argues that community-targeted and community-focused measures, aimed to counter radicalisation, identify certain individuals as their target audience and therefore include and exclude citizens, as Crawford (2008, p. 633), Muncie (2006, p. 11) and Akbarzadeh (2013, p. 453) argue. Rose (2000, p. 324; 2004, p. 233) elaborates on this and states that contemporary forms of governance, such as the enactment of local counter-radicalisation policies, in which the state is facilitator and partner and citizens responsible individuals, can be divided into two families; those that enmesh individuals or groups within forms of inclusion and those that enmesh individuals or groups within forms of exclusion (Rose, 2000, p. 327). This could differentiate a community into good/bad, moral/immoral, active/passive citizens, therefore causing a feeling of in- and exclusion. Based on these arguments, it is therefore argued that the enactment of both community-targeted and community-focused approaches will lead to practices of inclusion and exclusion within communities.

- *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level lead to the breakdown of trust within communities and therefore to the inability for community actors to carry out their duties properly*

The third hypothesis is based on the importance of trust for the local enactment of counter-radicalisation policies. First of all, trust among community actors is important, since “the success or failures of these initiatives will depend upon the extent to which trusting relationships are built between community policing actors” (Spalek, 2010, 791). Trust would not only enable the gathering of relevant information, but also cooperation. In return, this will benefit the enactment of counter-radicalisation measures (Spalek, 2010, p. 793; Tyler, 2003, p. 556). Second of all, trust between community actors and the community is also desirable because the position of community police actors, and specifically neighbourhood police officers, needs ‘actual’ trust to function. Third of all, trust between community actors and their national partners is also essential for the enactment of counter-radicalisation measures. This way information can be shared and collaborative partnerships can be made.

Although trust among community actors and the community members is important, trust is difficult to achieve and even more difficult to maintain, as Nooteboom (as cited by Goldsmith, 2005, p. 445) stipulates: “Trust arrives on foot, and departs on horseback”. Especially when looking at the enactment of community-focused and community-targeted approaches, since the latter would ‘negatively’ affect the enactment of the former, namely building and maintaining trust within a community. Furthermore, as Demos addresses, the targeting of specific groups which ought to be a threat, makes trust more necessary but “less feasible than ever” (as cited by Spalek, 2009, p. 7). Also Pantazis and Pemberton state this when they claim: “It is difficult to see how such skilful, yet ultimately fragile ‘soft approaches’ can thrive, when the full weight of state suspicion and the brutality of ‘hard’ methods have fallen on communities” (as cited by Spalek, 2009, p. 8).

Based on these arguments, it is argued that the combination of community-focused and community-targeted approaches to counter radicalisation would lead to the breakdown of trust among community actors and therefore to the inability to carry out their duties properly.

2.3 Object of study

This Master thesis aims to assess how community policing in the Netherlands effects the enactment of counter-radicalisation policies at the local level. The empirical focus is on the community-targeted and community-focused measures of the counter-radicalisation policies of four municipalities in the Netherlands; two municipalities who consist of between 150,000 and 600,000 inhabitants and two municipalities who consist of between 40,000 and 60,000 inhabitants. The focus of the research is to look at the lived experiences of the community actors involved, namely neighbourhood police officers, mayors, policy makers, social welfare organisations and youth workers. According to Prus (1996, p. 9) ‘lived experiences’ mean looking at the “meanings people attach to their situations and the ways in which they go about constructing their activities in conjunction with others”. Therefore, the perspectives, practices and discourses of the practitioners of the community-focused and community-targeted approaches have been analysed. By doing so, this research provides an in-depth examination of a real-life context in which counter-radicalisation policies are constructed.

2.4 Data generation

As Ungar (2003, p. 85) states, the use of qualitative methods within counter-terrorism studies can make a substantial contribution. Whereas quantitative research tends to fall short on the challenge accounting for the sociocultural context in which counter-terrorism occurs, qualitative research can account for this by focusing on the lived experiences of research participants and provide thick description (Ibid.). A limitation of qualitative research is that it can focus too much on one small part of a particular case and therefore cannot generalise the specific outcome. Nevertheless, qualitative research proved to be worthwhile for analysing the meaning-making practices of community actors in regard to counter-terrorism policies, since interviews and focus groups, as part of qualitative research, revealed how actors invoke different meanings to the policies they employ (Côte-Boucher, 2014, p. 198). Furthermore, as Stepputat (cited by Côte-Boucher, 2014, p. 199) argues, ‘policy outcomes are not just transmitted and implemented: they are translated into new genres for every step and every new actor or scale involved, and simultaneously the process generates new spaces of contestation’. Therefore, semi-structured interviews and documentary collection methods have been used to find out what the effects are of the ‘translated’ counter-radicalisation policies in everyday practice. First of all, the use of semi-structured interviewing gave guidance to the interview, while also provided room for unexpected insights given by the respondents. Second, documentary collections methods showed how actors give meaning to the combination of community-focused and community-targeted approaches of counter-radicalisation. According to Mogalakwe (2006, p. 221), documentary sources are based on ‘assumptions and presented in a certain way or style’ and thus telling us readers indirectly about the social world of the people who created them. Both primary and secondary documents have been used to provide ‘mediate access’ to past behaviour concerning the introduction of counter-radicalisation programs.

2.5 Sources

For this research, ten semi-structured interviews were conducted. These consist of four local policy makers specialised in counter-radicalisation and safety, one mayor, four local social welfare consultants and one

neighbourhood police officer. The criteria for the selection of the key respondents were that they are strategically positioned in the areas of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level and thus have some knowledge of that particular area. Furthermore, the key respondents have been sampled based on the specific research question and accessibility. The interviews were translated from Dutch to English. This translation process has been done in the most objective way possible in order to describe the perspectives of the respondents involved as precisely and clearly as possible.

Also several documents have been used for the analysis. The documents that were used for this research were position papers, policy documents and evaluation papers of the VNG, the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, the NCTV and the policy statements and counter-radicalisation guidelines of the four municipalities.

2.6 Data analysis

For this research, the generated data will be analysed by means of a sociological discourse analysis (Ruiz, 2009; Herra & Soriano, 2004). First, the meaning of *discourse* will be described. Second and lastly, the way this research relates to the three levels of sociological discourse analysis, namely the *textual*, *contextual* and *interpretive* level, will be put forward.

Discourse is defined as “any practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning” (Ruiz, 2009, p. 2). Discourses can be found in many forms. Yet, this research is focussed on *verbal discourse*, the spoken and written form of discourse which not only embeds meaning but also produces it (Ibid.). This way, it is possible to define the production and transmission of meaning-making which individuals within a particular community attached to their practices, in this case the effects of the enactment of counter-radicalisation policies towards local actors. This form of discourse is concerned with how we use language to ‘say things, do things, and be things’ (Gee, 2011, p. 3).

Sociological discourse analysis consists of three levels of analysis: the *textual*, *contextual* and the *interpretative* level. Before conceptualising these levels of analysis, it must be stressed that the levels figure as a ‘continuous dialogue’, which is ‘circular and bidirectional’ (Ruiz, 2009, p. 3).

The *textual* level of analysis considers that discourses are embedded in textual forms. In order to analyse the discourses, they must be translated into a textual form by means of description and transcription. For this research, the qualitative program Atlas.ti has been used to analyse and manage the interviews and documents. Within this analysis, attention was given to the manifest and latent meaning-making of the discourses.

The *contextual* level of analysis looks at the context in which discourses are produced and transmitted (Ruiz, 2009, p. 7). In this case, context is understood as “the space in which the discourse has emerged and in which it acquires meaning” (Ruiz, 2009, p. 7). Especially relevant for this research, is the situational analysis as part of the contextual level of analysis. Through this framework, emphasis is put on the understanding of the local meaning of the discourse. It goes beyond a mere description, but instead tries to find an initial explanation at a micro-sociological level, in this case the four Dutch municipalities.

The *interpretative* level involves “making connections between the discourse analysed and the social space in which they have emerged” (Ruiz, 2009, p. 10). This level focuses on the informative dimension of the discourse, being the knowledge of the reality by the subjects, the ideology dimension, meaning the ideological dominations, and the social product, the “discursive competence of the subject, which derives from

belonging to a social group and from the social experience that is conditioned by this belonging” (Ruiz, 2009, p. 11). The latter dimension was especially relevant for this research, since it enabled the researcher to take a ‘larger step away from discourse in that it establishes a connection with the wider social context’ in which counter-radicalisation policies are acted out (Ibid.).

2.7 Scope and limits

This research focused its efforts on four Dutch municipalities and the enactment of their current counter-radicalisation policies. Other policies as well as other municipalities in the Netherlands are not included. This brings us to the first limitation of this research. Schmid (2013, p. 47) states that since individual counter-radicalisation programs tend to be very context-specific in terms of both culture and locality, it remains difficult to transfer them to other places or to other types of movements. Crawford (2009, p. 16) also underlines this, since developments of security policies across Europe take different directions as they were influenced by ‘divergent political contexts’ and ‘socio-cultural traditions’. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from the way local government is anticipating in response to state-led policies and how this effects their local enactment.

Chapter 3 Discourse of radicalisation

This analysis discusses the first hypothesis, namely: *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level are programs of remoralisation: the labelling of deviants*. This chapter therefore looks whether the combination of community-focused and community-targeted approaches, aimed to counter radicalisation at the municipal level, are indeed programs of remoralisation and will lead to the labelling of a deviant ‘other’. First of all, it will look at how counter-radicalisation policies and their enactment are composed. Second, the chapter focusses on the fact that community actors indeed assign a deviant ‘other’ when counter-radicalisation are delegating to the municipal level. Third and lastly, it is argued that community actors do not produce programs of remoralisation, but instead leave room for discussion and different interpretations since they want to refrain from social issues as discrimination and social isolation, therefore keeping their role as community actors intact.

3.1 Composition of the discourse of radicalisation

The discourse from which community actors perceive radicalisation at the local level is based on their own interpretation of the situation in the field and what has been indicated by the Ministry of Security and Justice and the NCTV. Both the national and local policies regarding counter-radicalisation are therefore the composers of labelling those entities who presumed to be dangerous.

The national government plays an important part in setting a discourse of radicalisation as well as underlining fundamental issues when it comes to the enactment of local counter-radicalisation measures (ISD, 2010, p. 4). This is done through the ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’ and the ‘Approach radicalisation and counter-terrorism on a local level’ (NCTV, 2014a+b). Both policies, in which the combination of community-targeted and community-focused approaches is included, provide guidelines for community actors on how to perceive radicalisation within their communities and how to counter it. Those guidelines include suggestions on how to go about preparation, prevention, countering terrorist activities, dealing with direct threats and what needs to be done when there is an actual attack (NCTV, 2014a+b).

Both the ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’ and the ‘Approach radicalisation and counter-terrorism on a local level’ are specifically focussed on the countering and weakening of the “Jihadist movement” in the Netherlands (NCTV, 2014a, p. 2). Through these state practices, the national government creates a standard of what needs to be ‘replaced’; namely the Jihadist movement, meaning the “networks, groups, cells and individuals who follow the ideology and strategy of Jihadism” (NCTV, 2014a, p. 32). ‘Jihadism’ is according to these policies:

An ideological trend within political Islam which, on the basis of a specific description of the salafist doctrine and the thoughts of Sayyid Qutb, uses an armed battle (Jihad) in order to reach a global domination of the Islam and the reestablishment of the caliphate. [NCTV, 2014a, p. 31]

Reason for the specific focus on Jihadism within counter-radicalisation policies is the current threat of Jihadist terrorism (NCTV, 2015; Interview J, 2015; VNG, 2015b, p. 1). “Jihadism possess the biggest threat for the national security of the Netherlands and the international rule of law at this moment”, according to

Dick Schoof, head of the NCTV (NCTV, 2014b, p. 1). Hereby, the definition of Jihadism, that is used by both national and community actors, distances itself from Jihadism as the “general Islamic term, usually explained as an ‘effort for a common purpose’”, and is attributed to an ‘aggressive’ use of the term. In order to counter the Jihadist movement effectively, it is according to the national policy necessary to counter acts of ‘radicalisation’. Hereby, the terms Jihadism and Jihadist movement are currently intertwined within the discourse of radicalisation. The definition of radicalisation, which the Ministry of Security and Justice as well as the NCTV and the VNG use, is as follows:

Radicalisation is a process which shows the preparedness to except the extreme consequence of a way of thinking and is thereby willing to put that into practice.

[NCTV, 2014a, p. 33; VNG, 2008, p. 9]

Although the NCTV, VNG and the Ministry of Security and Justice acknowledge that there are also other forms of radicalisation, such as right-wing and animal rights radicalism, the use of the term within national and local policies’ discourses is currently associated with Jihadism and the Jihadist movement.

Community actors state however that the national government often does not have a clear view on what is happening at the local level. They are therefore not obligated to follow the national policies as they can design their own package of counter-radicalisation measures suitable for the local situation. This is highly appreciated by community actors, as is illustrated by a local youth worker: “If you as a government are going to say things like: ‘you have to do this and that’ (..) that is not going to work, because we are the only access they have to the field” (Interview H, 2015). A local manager of a social welfare organisation agrees with this when stating: “It is fine that there are instruments which you can use, as long as it is not obligatory to use them” (Interview I, 2015). A local mayor also underlines this: “We decide as a district and along with our partners what we are doing. There is some kind of toolbox (Toolbox Extremism developed by the NCTV, 2014, ed.) and from that toolbox we pick and choose what we want to use in our own community” (Interview G, 2015).

As community actors play a leading role in creating an ‘accurate image’ of radicalisation within their own domain, it is up to the municipalities to gather as much information as possible about definitions and characteristics of radicalisation and Jihadism from different community actors (NCTV, 2014b, p. 38). In practise, it remains a challenge for community actors to produce a construction of radicalisation that is suitable for the local situation, as the concept of radicalisation and Jihadism moves from one context to the other. This leads to confusion and a lack of clarity with the executors of the counter-radicalisation policies. This is illustrated by a local policy advisor: “I would call radicalisation a very brought definition with all kinds of different meanings. But is it the left group, is it the right group, or is it the middle group where we need to look at?” (Interview E, 2015). Several local policy advisors state that they will evaluate each possible indication of radicalisation since “interpretation is very situational” (Interview D, 2015). Furthermore: “We have no standard typifications. If our partners think that it has something to do with radicalisation, then they can come to us and we will examine the information” (Interview C, 2015). Another policy advisor emphasises the constant change in descriptions: “Today it is club X and tomorrow it is club Y. First it was ‘we are growing a

beard and we will put on a long dress'. Nowadays, it are just regular and neat looking people (..) and highly educated" (Interview D, 2015).

Thus, the discourse of radicalisation and the way it should be countered at the local level is formed through the interpretations of the community actors themselves and the national policies regarding radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. This context presents new challenges at the local level when it comes to deciding which section of the population needs to be targeted and to which moral standards the community members should apply.

3.2 Constructing the deviant 'other'

Based on the assumptions and perspectives of both the national and local policies and the local context, community actors establish a reality in which, mostly young, Dutch Muslims are 'risky' suspects of radicalisation. Along this line, community actors design a social construct of what they believe radicalisation is about and how it could be countered. Counter-radicalisation measures therefore function as a political tool through which community actors construct a deviant 'other'.

Several community actors perform on this discourse when bringing the counter-radicalisation measures into practice. As a local youth worker states: "There will be judging; there will be someone on the bench getting the signature Jihadist" (Interview H, 2015). Furthermore, he described a local incident at a school in which he shows his perspective on the labelling of deviants: "So he could not pray at school according to his director. Those are the ingredients which give such a guy the feeling of 'I am a Muslim, look at those Muslims; they are no good. The whole world should be a Muslim state'" (Interview H, 2015). The link between radicalisation and the Muslim community is further emphasised: "We are looking closer at the Muslim community when we hear something (..) you will immediately link that to radicalisation (..) while in the past we always thought that it would have nothing to do with issues like radicalisation". (Interview G, 2015). One local mayor confirms in a direct way that she is more aware about the Muslim community due to the local responsibility of countering radicalisation: "Yes, I am more aware. If I am really honest, yes I am. That is definitely the case, especially on the Muslim community (..) due to this toolbox (Toolbox Extremism, NCTV, ed), we definitely saw the need to pay them a visit" (Interview G, 2015).

Thus, community actors state that they pay specific attention to the Muslim community as a whole when countering radicalisation. As a response, community actors act on this discourse of radicalisation.

3.3 The production of a counter-message

Through this process of constructing a deviant 'other', community actors state that they are aware of this process of labelling potential Muslims as enactors of radicalisation. As one policy advisor puts it: "We look at local mosques for instance because we want to prevent something, but at the same time you have the general thought of 'all Muslims are bad'" (Interview E, 2015). Furthermore: "You have to deal with your Muslim community where you need to take a good look at, but the moment something is going on, you notice that people are going to point fingers" (Interview E, 2015).

Community actors therefore argue that they want to refrain from this process of labelling. As one policy advisor states: "I notice that we are trying to get rid of that focus. Because when you do pay attention to that, you will possibly have the effect of unintended discrimination (..) Because they can also be Dutch.

That doesn't matter to me (..) if someone says; 'I am going for the Islam', then you must not talk to that person in a negative way about the Islam. Everybody can preach what they stand for" (Interview D, 2015). This way community actors want to strive for a consistent debate regarding the meaning of radicalisation and prevent issues concerning discrimination and social isolation, as these factors would threaten their position as community actors. As one neighbourhood police officer describes it: "The other day I found the symbol of the Nazi-swastika on a pipe-line. You should also be worried about that; that is also radicalisation" (Interview, B, 2015). Also a consultant of a social welfare organisation has the opinion that you must not link Jihadism automatically to acts of radicalisation, since that would lead to "discrimination and social isolation" (Interview J, 2015): "When you bring radicalisation into practice, you must also point at the radicalisation of the left, of the right etcetera. If not, then you are like; 'yes, the Muslims; they are the radicals!" (Interview J, 2015). Moreover: "When you execute a policy like that, how will that affect Muslim youngsters? They will think like; 'but there are also other radicals, why are they only discussing Muslim radicals? (..) It is important that you are consistent in your discourse (Interview J, 2015). The manager of another social welfare organisation builds on this: "So when we discuss radicalisation, we also just name it radicalisation (..) radical extremism. I like to, and the training I followed helped me with that, not just focus on the Islam because I condemn every act of radicalisation" (Interview I, 2015).

In order to refrain from this process of labelling, community actors aim to produce 'positive alternatives' which could complement their role as community actors. As a local policy advisor states: "It is important to remain a neutral government. It cannot be the case that you highlight certain things because of religious arguments" (Interview D, 2015). These positive alternatives indicate that there are no absolute 'right' or 'wrong' moral standards to which community members should comply. This way, community actors leave room for the discussion and deliberation about different interpretations and perspectives on radicalisation and Jihadism among community members.

First of all, several community actors state that in order to create moral standards applicable to the local situation, community actors themselves need to let go of "certain images" that they might have about a specific group in society: "What we try to do (..) when you have certain situations where you focus on guys with long beards and such (..) we learn each other that this could have a meaning but it does not necessarily mean that someone is radicalising" (Interview I, 2015). In addition to that, several consultants of a social welfare organisation state that they "need to be aware of their own perspective" (Interview J, 2015) meaning the way they perceive the world around them. This way, community actors are able to create standards which conform to the local situation at hand.

Second of all, it is argued that community actors need to have "good arguments" on why they behave in a certain way, therefore preventing confusion among community members and unnecessary accusations. Since it remains difficult to reach consensus among community actors to which moral standards community members need to conform too, community actors need to be able to explain their actions towards the community. As a local social welfare consultant says: "Our team is not unanimous in the interpretation of signals" (Interview I, 2015). Furthermore: "Community actors will not always do it right or are able to stop radicalisation" (Interview D & I, 2015). It therefore remains important to explain why you undertake certain actions.

Once moral standards are developed, community actors use different definitions for the actual enactment of the standards. Each definition has in common that the enactment of the standards is not ‘pedantic’ (“so not pedantic or very wise, so not someone who is visiting you with a suit on and a tie around his neck” Interview C, 2015), not ‘forcing’ (“you need to have a customer service attitude or perspective”, Interview D, 2015) and not ‘imposing’ (“about the democratic rule of law (..) that is not something that is imposed”, Interview J, 2015). Community actors therefore do not want to take over somebody’s thoughts, but instead want to give people the opportunity to choose their own lifestyle and, like one policy maker stressed, let them “build their own lives (..) since that is what we see as meaningful” (Interview C, 2015). Moreover, community actors ‘seduce’ (“not changing somebody’s mind; not moralising but seducing”, Interview D, 2015), ‘advice’, ‘transform’, provide ‘alternatives’, ‘help’ and place things in perspective (“we want to shake their thoughts a little bit”, Interview E, 2015). All with the purpose to firstly provide alternatives to the definition of Jihadism and an ‘alternative’ image of Jihad, instead of the “ignorant” definitions giving by the Ministry of Security and Justice on the matter (Interview J, 2015). According to two social welfare consultants, the Ministry of Security and Justice too easily intertwines Jihadism with extremism, therefore neglecting the “beautiful side” of Jihadism (Interview J, 2015).

In addition, community actors, and the municipality specifically, do not want to be pedantic towards the community actors they cooperate with when they counter radicalisation. The municipality specifically is not telling community partners what they can and cannot do and what they should and should not teach community members. Instead, the municipality should work with the things the community partners already know and build from their own experiences in the field. “We (the municipality, ed.) are strengthening the approach they (community partners, ed.) already have”, Interview J, 2015). Therefore, the municipality will not tell them what is right and what is wrong when they counter radicalisation on a local level.

Thus, community actors do not set clear standards on what is right and what is not, but instead try to remain open for different perspectives which are not necessarily obligated by the community actors themselves or the national government. This way, community actors set up a counter-message in which thinking and learning together with the community is central. This way they state that they can prevent the labelling of a deviant ‘other’ while also keeping their role as community actors intact.

Chapter 4 Counter-radicalisation policies: practices of inclusion and exclusion

The previous chapter stated that counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level indeed contribute to the labelling of a deviant ‘other’ but nevertheless leave room for discussion and different interpretations concerning issues of radicalisation and Jihadism. Following the first hypothesis, this chapter focusses on the second hypothesis, which states that *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level cause a feeling of inclusion or exclusion within communities*. This chapter discusses whether the combination of community-focused and community-targeted approaches, aimed to counter radicalisation at the municipal level, does indeed lead to a feeling of inclusion or exclusion among local citizens. Thereby, this chapter focusses solely on the perspectives of the community actors involved. First, it is argued that community actors believe that counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level lead to a feeling of inclusion since they mainly incorporate a community-focused approach. Second and lastly, although it is part of the instruments which municipalities can use to counter radicalisation, community-targeted approaches cause a feeling of exclusion among citizens according to the community actors. It is for this reason that community actors are more in favour of using a community-focused approach when countering radicalisation.

4.1 The community-focused approach: striving for inclusion

Community actors state that their main goal is to prevent people from getting arrested and leaving the country because of acts of radicalisation. Since community-targeted approaches run counter to this, they stress that they put more emphasis on the use of community-focused approaches when countering radicalisation on a local level. As a consultant specialised in radicalisation issues describes: “Municipalities are focussed on the aspect of the inclusive society; the integration of minorities, the prohibition of social exclusion and trying to give a perspective” (Interview A, 2015).

Community actors consider the use of community-focused approaches, such as trainings and intercultural dialogues, as effective measures to increase ‘active citizenship’ and ‘social integration’ and to decrease feelings of discrimination and social isolation (VNG, 2008, p. 47). As a local policy advisor states: “But you now currently hear all too often that people have less chances and that there is discrimination, or at least, they have that feeling, that they cannot get jobs, those are current facts, and that is awful. It leads to distance between people, the feeling that they are not excepted” (Interview C, 2015). In order to overcome this, community-focussed measures in which intercultural dialogues and trainings play a major role, are seen as the instruments to reach the level of an ‘inclusive society’ and counter radicalisation, according to the community actors. For them, these community-focused approaches, called ‘preventative measures’ by the community actors, can create a feeling of inclusion. For them, inclusion indicates “having a perspective” (Interviews A & C, 2015), “safety” (Interviews G, H, I & J, 2015) and “no acts of discrimination and isolation, because that will lead to exclusion” (Interview J, 2015). To reach this, community actors give individuals the possibility to elaborate on what they need, pay them visits and adjust their behaviour and language to the community members.

First of all, community-focused approaches are considered to be particularly prevalent for the increase of inclusion since they specifically focus on the needs of the group and the individual, instead of delegating community members what to do. As a social welfare consultant explains: “We have organised activi-

ties within our own building (...) those are very much focussed on providing a perspective for the future, building trust, participation and learning how to communicate and how to behave themselves” (Interview I, 2015).

It nevertheless remains difficult for community actors to figure out exactly what citizens want. As clearly illustrated by a social welfare consultant, community actors will pro-actively talk to citizens in order to figure out what their needs are. This way community actors are able to develop programs which contribute to the sense of belonging to a community:

What do youngsters want? Youngsters want (...) This is a hard question (...) Youngsters want answers but, and I don't mean this in a negative way, youngsters do not formulate their questions, they do not pose them that directly. Obviously, they show a certain type of behaviour. But there are not so many youngsters who asks specific question about life. So you have to try to figure that out. They do not want anything to do with authority of some sort. They will never go to our desk, saying; 'well, I have this and that on my mind'. It is within patterns of behaviour. So we approach them in a pro-active way. [Interview I, 2015]

This corresponds with the way also other community actors collaborate in practise with their citizens. A local policy advisor gives the example of the cooperation between his municipality and the local mosque after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. He explains how the municipality listened to the needs of the local mosque: “We informed the local committee of the mosque and asked them to participate in our procession and then yeah (...) that was on a Thursday evening and of course Friday night is time to pray, then we will make sure we are around to keep a close eye. (...) That is the way (...) yeah, to give the people a sense of yeah (...) they get a sense of the fact that somebody is taking care of them (...) to give a sense of security” (Interview D, 2015). This example stresses the importance of talking and listening to the citizens to figure out what they specifically need. As a local community police officer states: “You investigate what they are doing, do they have certain areas where they would like to hang-out” (Interview B, 2015). A local policy advisor adds to this: “We try to help people who want to organise activities and if necessary we will create specific activities of our own. So each and every activity (...) all the initiatives who could contribute to that inclusive society are welcome and we will collaborate to make it happen” (Interview F, 2015). A mayor stresses the importance of cooperation between a diverse range of citizens: “We also try to organise collaborative religious services with the Catholics and the Protestants (...) I also invited the Muslim community to some council meetings; they said they will definitely join. I would also like to have a multicultural list of municipal candidates in the future” (Interview G, 2015).

Second of all, the fact that community actors visit the community members is considered to be another reason for the fact that the enactment of counter-radicalisation policies at the local level does not lead to a feeling of exclusion. As a local youth worker explained it: “Go to them, also behind the door (...) I regularly meet with them to have a drink and just sit somewhere” (Interview H, 2015). This is also underlined by a local mayor when she described a visit to the local mosque: “I haven't invited them at my office, I went to them” (Interview G, 2015). The relevance of meeting people outside of the own organisation, is furthermore

underlined by a local policy advisor: “If you want to change something, it isn’t going to happen inside this building” (Interview C, 2015).

Third of all, adjusting the language and behaviour of community actors to the community members is also considered to be a feature which could prevent people from feeling excluded. Several community actors state that you need to adjust your own way of speaking to the way of speaking used by the citizens in order to reach them (Interview B, D & J, 2015). One policy advisor illustrates this clearly:

You stand in front of a dog. If you talk to that dog in a way that is similar to an eulogy, then that dog will put his tail between his legs (..) he would not like that at all, although you perhaps say the nicest things to him. But if you say the most horrendous things to him in a rather happy way, then he would properly wag his tail. That is the same situation as with people. The way you speak to them, the music, the story. Those things decide if something succeeds or not. [Interview D, 2015]

The adjustability of community actors to a certain situation and a certain individual or group, is furthermore underlined by a local neighbourhood police officer: “If you put me either in front of an entrepreneur from a million-dollar company or the local junk; I can easily adjust (..) you have to speak their language” (Interview B, 2015).

Moreover, community actors state that their role is particularly suited for keeping a ‘relationship’ intact with community members. This is illustrated by a local policy advisor:

Keeping the relationship in mind is not the job of the police, they just need to do their work. It has to be arranged that somebody is going there and asks; ‘what can we do for you?’. We cannot prohibit a house seeking but we can see how we could soften the relationship (..) this is done by the municipality. [Interview D, 2015]

Also another local policy advisor stresses this: “We are mainly focused on prevention, like talking to people and keeping the conversation going. So repression is not our goal. We do things from a preventative angle” (Interview F, 2015). Another local policy advisor agrees with this, when stating: “We work on monitoring and prevention. That goes before repression and that is also the thing we strive for the most when you talk about safety” (Interview E, 2015). Hereby, community actors are viewed as entities who mainly focus on the ‘soft’ approaches of countering radicalisation. According to the respondents, this role of community actors is considered to be effective when it comes to the enhancement of an inclusive society.

Additionally, community actors also state that they want to involve community members when countering radicalisation. Instead of treating certain citizens differently, as in this case the individuals and groups who might align with the Jihadist movement, the municipality of this policy advisor wants to include them: “Mosques are not part of the problem, they are part of the solution” (Interview C, 2015).

Thus, community actors consider the use of community-focused approaches, such as discussions and intercultural dialogues, to be more effective when it comes to providing a sense of inclusion. They therefore also act on this, by visiting community members, listening to their needs and adjusting their language. This way, community actors state that they can provide a feeling of inclusion among community members.

4.2 The community-targeted approach: coping with exclusion

When it comes to creating a feeling of inclusion in a community, community-focused approaches are considered to be effective measures to make this happen. Community-targeted approaches, called ‘repressive measures’ by the community actors, run counter to this as they would exclude people from society.

Some community actors state that using community-targeted approaches does not fit into the job description of a municipality at all: “You need to wonder whether repression would still make prevention possible” (Interview J, 2015). A local policy advisor states: “The repressive measures are quite harsh” (Interview, C, 2015). Within the community-targeted approach, emphasis is put on selective housing allocation based on criminal behaviour, the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship when activities or preparations concerning radicalisation are acted out, the prohibition of entering certain areas, hailing and monitoring (VNG, 2015; Ministry of Security and Justice, 2015). Also the current draft of the bill regarding temporary administrative tasks of counter-terrorism could limit the feeling of inclusion. Community actors argue that the bill does put community actors in a difficult position when it comes to the enactment of their own position as community-focused actors (VNG, 2015). As a youth worker argues:

I am not an investigation officer, I am not a police agent, I don’t work for the OM, I work at social welfare (..) I would definitely give them the following advice: ‘please let us fulfil our role, let us be the bridge to the street. That would be the only thing (..) let us do our job, let us stay in the role we have. [Interview H, 2015]

A social welfare consultant also states that this bill would make it harder for communities to enact their community-focused approaches: “If I look at what comes across with youngsters and parents, is that issue about taking your passport (..) they have the idea that they cannot go to the municipality (..) they have the idea that their passport will be taken away if they go there” (Interview J, 2015).

Since municipalities and other community actors are expected to use both community-focused and community-targeted measures to counter radicalisation, community actors stress that they put more emphasis on the actual use of community-focused approaches and on explaining that they use these approaches to counter radicalisation. As a local policy advisor states: “Everything we do has an influence on the connection with the community. Therefore, we have to explain everything and besides that; we are very much aware that what we do is proportionate with the threat we are fighting against, or with the result that we want to achieve” (Interview C, 2015).

Several community actors argue that because their aim is to work towards an inclusive community, they now put more emphasis on preventative measures and therefore on their role as mother and father of the community (Interview C, F & G, 2015). They do this by being open and honest about both their repressive and preventative actions (Interviews B, C & E, 2015). Therefore, although current counter-radicalisation policies in the Netherlands consist of preventative and repressive measures, the emphasis on preventative measures is evident. As a consultant explains it: “The most sustainable task or instrument for municipalities lies within prevention” (Interview A, 2015). Also a social welfare consultant agrees with this, when stating: “I think that it is good that we all take care of an inclusion approach and that starts with prevention” (Interview I, 2015). The use of community-targeted approaches is therefore seen as a last resort. As illustrated by a local policy advisor:

When there are four or five police cars in front of the house, ten police officers in the front and ten in the back, then they enter (..) crashing the door. And I say (..) during these situation, we must keep the relationship in mind if we want to make sure those people can de-radicalise (..). [Interview D, 2015]

In the end, community actors believe that a municipality can use both preventative and repressive measures to reach an inclusive society and to counter radicalisation as long as they explain that their first intentions are based on prevention instead of repression. As a local policy advisor states: “The measures are part of the same coin (..) Repression is definitely part of the job description of a municipality” (Interview D, 2015). A mayor adds to this: “If it is necessary then you should not walk away from repression (..) I believe that there is a balanced approach between the repression and preventative measures” (Interview G, 2015). This indicates that municipalities are to be held responsible for the enactment of both preventative and also repressive measures would that become necessary for countering radicalisation. Another local policy advisor adds to this: “We do not know if those policies truly help, or that it just causes people to feel alienated. But if you see what happened in Paris and in Belgium, we definitely have to take those measures. Also as a municipality (..) we do not want such a thing happening in our community” (Interview C, 2015).

Thus, community actors argue that although community-targeted approaches are necessary to counter radicalisation on a local level, they could extent a feeling of exclusion within communities. Therefore, community actors put more emphasis on the actual use of community-focused approaches and on explaining that they first and foremost want to maintain a preventative approach when countering radicalisation.

Chapter 5 The importance of trust for counter-radicalisation practices

The previous chapter stated that the delegation of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level results in the increased focus on the use of community-focused approaches by community actors. According to them, community-targeted approaches are necessary when counter-radicalisation measures are to be enacted but could lead to a feeling of exclusion among citizens. Community-focused approaches, such as regular intercultural dialogues, could instead lead to a feeling of inclusion among citizens according to community actors. Following the second hypothesis, this chapter focuses on the third and final hypothesis, which states: *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level lead to the breakdown of trust within communities and therefore to the inability for community actors to carry out their duties properly.* This chapter will discuss how community actors understand, experience and develop trust when it comes to the enactment of local counter-radicalisation measures.

5.1 Importance of trust when countering radicalisation

An important condition for the enactment of counter-radicalisation measures on a local level, is the presence of trust between citizens and community actors and between community actors and their partners, since trust would prevent acts of radicalisation leading to extremist violence and people leaving the country.

According to the community actors there are several reasons why trust is considered to be important for the successful enactment of counter-radicalisation policies.

First of all, trust proves to be an effective instrument for sharing ideas and perceptions among community members, therefore giving individuals the feeling they are part of a community. This is illustrated by a local policy advisor: “It is important that citizens get the feeling that they are being heard (..) we therefore have an open attitude” (Interview E, 2015).

Second of all, trust can give community members the opportunity to get acquainted with each other. This way, community members can be put at ease which makes it easier for them to open up and discuss problems. As a neighbourhood police officer indicates: “You are someone where they can go to if they have an issue of some sort. They can get advice from us; some things do not immediately lead to a prosecution” (Interview B, 2015). A mayor adds to this: “I find it important that they know me so that they can find me when something is going on (..) As long as you know things about each other, you can try to understand each other. And when you understand each other, you can truly freely live side by side” (Interview G, 2015).

Third of all, trust promotes the flow of information. Sharing information is extremely important when it comes to enacting counter-radicalisation policies at a local level. Not only because of the fact that information is necessary for the actual gathering of security intelligence and getting a ‘full picture’ of a situation, but also because a lack of trust could increase general suspicion and undermine partnerships between citizens and community actors and among community actors and partners.

Fourth and lastly, trust can improve cooperation. Cooperation is especially important for the local enactment of counter-radicalisation measures, since a diverse range of different types of actors has to work together in order to actually enact the counter-radicalisation measures. As a social welfare consultant states:

When you do report something, and say; ‘we have done everything when it comes to prevention but it did not work out and I am really worried that something is going to happen’. You should then trust your partner that they will work with it adequately and in a confidential way and that they will not harm the trustful relation which you had built. [Interview J, 2015]

To sum up, trust is considered to be important for the local enactment of counter-radicalisation measures. It is for this reason that community actors focus their efforts on the measures which promote the level of trust. This way, community actors are able to carry out their duties as actors of social control.

5.2 Limitations to trust

Currently, community actors state that trust can be at stake when enacting counter-radicalisation policies on a municipal level and therefore to the inability for them to carry out their local tasks. In response to this, community actors stipulate that they actively focus their efforts on measures which could promote trust between them and community members and partners.

A first feature which limits the extent of trust on a local level, are the counter-radicalisation measures themselves. The presence of trust between community actors and members is according to the community actors severely undermined because of the combination of community-focused and community-targeted approaches to counter radicalisation. Because of this combination, community actors do not only need to build a relationship with community members, but also monitor them for possible signs of radicalisation. This exact combination could limit the existence of trust within a community by jeopardising the act of community policing and halt the flow of information between community partners. As a local policy advisor states:

Trust is extended by visiting the local mosques, and show us there. We visit the local community centre, we visit the community and tell something about what we do, and on the other hand we undermine it, unconsciously, maybe consciously but unintended, because we are of course working with repressive measures as well where we also play a role and of which we are also aware. [Interview C, 2015]

A second feature which limits the extent of trust on a local level, is the issue of information sharing between community actors and their partners. Countering radicalisation on a local level is done through the cooperation between the local partners, being the municipality and other community actors like neighbourhood police officers and social welfare organisations, and national partners, being the General Intelligence and Security Services of the Netherlands (AIVD), the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the Ministry of Security and Justice and the National Coordinator Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV). In order to make this cooperation work and maintain a level of trust in partners and between partners, it is not only necessary to have overall commitment by the actors. There must also be a change in the way information is managed and decision-making is organised. No longer can national partners work from a top down approach. Instead, they must get used to a new working climate where trust forms the basis and information can be distributed. Also the NCTV mentions in their *Toolbox Extremism* (2014, p.1) that the sharing of information among partners requires trust between partners: “In order to share information, trust is necessary”.

Nevertheless, cooperation with national partners on the issue of countering radicalisation remains a challenge. Especially the lack of sharing information concerning issues of radicalisation by the national partners causes tensions between them and the community actors. Although it is generally understood by the community actors that not all information can be shared because of state security, the fact that it limits their successful enactment of counter-radicalisation policies at the local level is considered to be something that needs to be solved. This is illustrated by a policy advisor radicalisation: “The issue of information-sharing is one of the biggest challenges for local parties in their fight against radicalisation. The mayor is vulnerable and most often doesn’t have all the information, or has very little information because of state security (..) I understand this, but it also makes things very difficult for local governance” (Interview A, 2015). This is also highlighted by a local policy advisor: “The police (national police, ed.) and the OM; it is difficult to share information which is coming from them. But we say; ‘if we want to and need to control the process, we need to know what is going on in the city, otherwise we cannot do it” (Interview C, 2015).

Not only prohibits the lack of information the actual enactment in the field, it also works ineffective for the role enactment of the municipality as a director in the counter-radicalisation process. Since the municipality is considered to take the lead when it comes to the enactment of counter-radicalisation policies, community members will look at the municipality when something goes wrong. A lack of information could therefore undermine their tasks as directors. A local policy advisor gives the example of their cooperation with the AIVD:

Say hi when you meet them (laughs). We never hear from them. (..) That is a shame, at some point you need them. But then the giant box closes; you never hear from them again. But I find it important (..) it is because of the role of the mayor. The mayor is centre of attention when things go wrong. He does not need to hear everything, but it would be great if he would hear like; ‘mayor, this might be important for you, you know it now but we have to deal with it further because it is part of our job description. You’ve done your job’. [Interview D, 2015]

The fact that radicalisation is also considered as being a national security issue, makes it according to the community actors sometimes difficult to cooperate: “Some partners work nationally, so their policy is also nationally oriented. I therefore believe that we have to work on these problems locally, but in cooperation with the national partners in order to make it work. But that is sometimes difficult”, as a local policy advisor states (Interview C, 2015).

However, the general cooperation and level of trust between community actors is considered to be effective. As a policy advisor states: “We are all very approachable. We just stop by each other’s offices. We can count on each other” (Interview E, 2015). A social welfare manager also states this when she explains the cooperation between her and her ‘workers’ on the street:

I just visit them, shaking hands, I am just me (..) they know me as being me, they don’t even know my last name (..) I think that is good (..) I like to be approachable. We discuss how things are going with the programs, how they are feeling (..) we do it together. That is a symbol for a good relationship, I believe. [Interview I, 2015]

Thus, two features limit the extent of trust on a local level. Community actors state that the counter-radicalisation measures themselves contradict each other, therefore making it difficult for them to build trust. Moreover, the lack of information-sharing between local and national partners does not contribute to an increase in trust between the actors.

5.3 Trust-building and the meaning of trust on a local level

Community actors are aware of the ‘paradoxical’ combination of counter-radicalisation measures. Because of this they actively underline several ways of trust-building, which they believe will increase the level of trust between them and the community members and partners while also fulfilling their duties respectfully.

The way community actors understand and experience trust is formed through their direct engagement with community members and fellow local partners. According to the community actors, trust is shown by visiting community members and other local partners personally. This way, community actors show who they are and have the ability to have face-to-face discussions. Trust is in this case defined as ‘being approachable’ and ‘subservient’ towards community members and local partners, as the following quotation from a neighbourhood police officer indicates: “We are on the street, we are on social media (..) we are approachable (..) personal contact is always there and it works! The municipality is also very pro-active in this and that is great (Interview B, 2015). A local policy advisor also states this, when saying:

Having conversations with people is much more convenient and useful for building trust than people would think (..) we definitely gain trust when we talk with someone face-to-face. We do not come along just to build a fence. We also try to build from trust; that is the goal. [Interview D, 2015]

This is also the case when looking at the way community actors, and especially the municipality, understand trust between them and national partners. By organising meetings at the municipality and visiting the offices of the national partners, such as the offices of the Ministry of Security and Justice and the NCTV in the Hague, trust can be extended, according to the community actors. However, the actual visits of the local policy advisors to these offices remains limited. This influences the level of trust and also cooperation between the partners since national partners therefore not always know what happens in the field, according to the community actors. As one policy advisor states: “They don’t understand shit. That is because they are so far away from the field. We as a municipality are so close. The mayor walks in the street and he speaks with people. The ministry and the AIVD are an entire world on their own” (Interview D, 2015). Since local partners do position themselves in the field, community actors state that trust and collaboration between them can be maintained. As a youth worker explains: “We have a great relationship with the neighbourhood police officers on the street (..) we meet them on the street, we have a coffee on the police station. We know each other, we know what each of us is worth: just a very good connection between us” (Interview H, 2015).

Additionally, trust is understood by community actors as doing something for a community member and local partner. By undertaking a certain action for community members, and thereby getting personally involved, community actors state that they can build a trustworthy relationship. As a policy advisor argues: “Trust is just doing something, for example when nobody else is doing something. Then you as a municipality will do something. That is just the way you go about it” (Interview D, 2015). Furthermore, showing the

results of a certain action also contributes to the level of trust, as a local policy advisor shows: “You need to show that something is happening, that you do something with the information. So we must not say like: ‘Okay, that is a good idea’ and do nothing with it. So showing that you do something with it is very important” (Interview G, 2015). A neighbourhood police officer gives another example of a pro-active gesture by a community actor:

Few months ago, some people posted a message on a Facebook-page saying they would burn down the mosque. Then they worry of course (..) This is a sign for us to go there, have a talk. When I got there, I saw that there were several plants and bushes around the building. That is not convenient, we should get rid of those (..) And then the partners come around. One e-mail to the municipality, and the next day all the bushes were gone. So also the municipality recognises the need to be cautious about this issue, they recognise the sense of security you need to provide for your citizens. [Interview B, 2015]

Moreover, according to community actors trust is extended by ‘being open’ and ‘transparent’ towards community members and local partners. This would create the possibility to show the ‘real’ intentions of the community actors. As explained by a mayor: “Just be open and transparent. You don’t want to play a game; that is no use (..) You will probably cause a lot more trouble if you are going to be suspicious about your intentions” (Interview G, 2015). Since community members often question what community actors will do with the information they get, community actors choose to explain that they on the one hand monitor, and that they have the opportunity to report a possible suspect if they want to, and that they are on the other hand available for guidance and advice. This way, community actors believe that trust between them and the community members will improve and that the actors themselves can execute their duties as agents of social control. However, in order to maintain this trust, community actors state that they need to keep explaining what their intentions are. This is also underlined by a local policy advisor: “You have to talk to them. Every time you have to explain what you are doing (..) explain, explain, explain, explain” (Interview D, 2015). Another local policy advisor adds: “You have to show them that you are not here to catch them” (Interview E, 2015). A local youth worker illustrated this as well:

Two guys were busy doing burglaries and I just said: ‘look, don’t you tell me what you are doing when I am gone (..) If I turn my back on you and you do this and that and I have to hear from uncle police officer that you are involved in the theft of a bicycle or maltreatment or whatever (..) I say: ‘listen, if I know it, I have to report it to the neighbourhood police officer, whether you like it or not. Because when you do that you screw me. I’ve been hanging out with you guys for like a year, I have never screwed you, but when you screw me it is over. I will do nothing for you anymore’. Then you (..) suddenly see that you have climbed one or two stairs on the trust-relationship-ladder. [Interview E, 2015]

The effectiveness of being transparent and open about your intentions in order to maintain mutual trust, is however contradicted by two social welfare consultants. They state that it is not convenient to tell communi-

ty members everything you do: “When an organisation, like this one or a school, is known by the fact that they monitor (..) then they can do nothing with prevention. You should not say to that specific youngster that you are going to report it. When that is out in the open, all the other youngsters will not listen to you” (Interview J, 2015). Nevertheless, openness and transparency about the intentions of the community actors are considered to be important while enacting counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level. Especially also when it comes to cooperation with other local partners. Community actors state that they are also open and transparent about their actions and intentions towards other local partners. This because of the fact that they find it important to underline their role as community actors, and do not want to be seen as ‘extensions of the government’ as that would decrease the level of trust. As a social welfare consultant states:

We are not an extension of the government. We have our own role. It is also a choice that we do not want to have that other role. That is our credit, our credibility (..) When you talk about a theme (radicalisation, ed.) like this, you have to be very aware (..) as a team we are also very transparent and open. Also about the fact where our money comes from. Because it will raise questions when you are not transparent about that (..) we are definitely clear about the fact that we are not an extension of the government. [Interview J, 2015]

Because of this openness and transparency, community actors believe that the level of trust between them can be maintained. As another social welfare consultant states: “You need to keep explaining that this is the way we do it. I think we are able to do that at this moment (..) transparency is the best answer” (Interview J, 2015).

Community actors also state that in order to both keep the trust and also gain necessary information from community members, it is important to first ask some ‘general’ questions and engage with the community members, before exchanging information relevant for countering radicalisation. This is highlighted by a local policy advisor, when he explains how community actors go about monitoring specific individuals or groups for signs of radicalisation: “You need to start the conversation. That means (..) you must not walk to somebody and say like; ‘I totally see that you are radicalising; why do you do that? You should take a look at the persons interests” (Interview D, 2015). As another local policy advisor argues: “We need the signals and that is why we have given our partners the tools on how to go about it to keep the trust and keep the dialogue going” (Interview C, 2015).

Also the frequency of contact is decisive for the level of trust. When contact is consistent and long-term, trusted relationships can grow according to the community actors. This is why community actors strive to join community members for extensive periods of time. As a youth worker explains: “We stay with them for a couple of hours or sometimes the entire evening. From the moment of that first contact, we are building a relationship. Trustful and meaningful relationship (..) Now I know some guys for four or five years” (Interview E, 2015). As a policy advisor radicalisation states: “You need to stay in touch with your communities in order to create trustful relationships” (Interview A, 2015). A neighbourhood police officer even states that he is being missed if he doesn’t visit his regular community members for a week: “Every week. We drive by, talk to them; without any specific reason (..) They even find it strange if you do not stop to chat. Then the next week they ask: ‘where were you?’. We have a strong relationship (Interview B, 2015). This is also the

case when looking at the local partners. Community actors state that, based on the local situation, municipalities, neighbourhood police officers and youth workers meet almost every week to exchange information and keep a certain level of trust between them. As a social welfare manager states: “Our youth workers meet with the local police at least twice a week. Once every three months we discuss things with all the partners, so also the security house and the department of radicalisation of the municipality” (Interview I, 2015).

Moreover, also the role in which the community actors approach a community member and local partner is important when it comes to trust. Especially for community members it is important that they see individual community actors and their programs independent from ‘authority’ in order to gain trust. As a social welfare consultant states: “If somebody has signs that this person can travel to Syria at any moment, then he or she needs to report it personally, not as an institution” (Interview J, 2015). This is also illustrated by a local policy advisor when he states: “We are visiting in regular clothes, no Stars and Stripes on our forehead. That is the power of the municipality” (Interview D, 2015). A youth worker explains that he deliberately uses ‘slang’ and emotion when he talks to his youngsters in order to gain trust from them:

Sometimes I go all crazy and talk like a Moroccan. (...) I can behave just as crazy as those guys on the street. And then they start laughing like crazy, but at that moment I am really inside their heads and then I just get along with them the same way as they act towards each other. Then I am going to use the same language. (...) Then I also say like: ‘mother-fucker, screw yourself, I am not mother fucking gay, only gay people fuck each other from the back. Don’t you dare fuck me in the ass. You have a problem now, not me. Fuck it guy, I am just here to help you out. (...) What do you want?’. Sometimes they say: ‘listen, when I close my eyes, I would swear that you are one of my bro’s. You talk the same way, you act the same way’. [Interview H, 2015]

When community actors approach other community actors, the position of the role is not adjusted and sometimes even more underlined to make clear what the specific actor stands for as an organisation. As a social welfare manager states: “They (municipality, ed.) are very much aware of the things we can do and what we cannot do. And they let us be” (Interview I, 2015). This is also highlighted by a social welfare consultant: “We just said to them; ‘this is what we can do and this is our role’ (...) I would not say that we are executives of the government, because that will affect our role. But yeah (...) we have a common purpose, like also with other areas within this society. So we definitely found each other” (Interview J, 2015). Community actors furthermore underline that especially during crises, local partners are all striving towards the same goal, namely collective security, and therefore don’t experience the need to alter their role as a local actor, although their role descriptions are usually very different from one another. As a local policy advisor illustrates: “With issues like radicalisation, you see no difference anymore of rank and position. Each and everyone is responsible for our safety and you want to solve it together. There is another kind of chemistry and you want to go for it together. That is the beauty of security” (Interview D, 2015). A social welfare consultant adds to this: “Neighbourhood community officers and workers (youth workers, ed) are getting along (...) playing the good and the bad cop together. That is going smoothly. The police also acknowledges the qualities of the youth workers and the value of the communication” (Interview I, 2015).

The importance of language and the use of emotion for building trust is also underlined by a social welfare consultant:

It is really important that you have an emotional bond (..) Then you are able to speak the language. Otherwise, you perhaps speak Dutch, but it will remain that way. It has little effect on the behaviour. This will also increase trust on the basis of (..) how do you say it (..) some kind of love between student and teacher. Not just sitting in front of the class and then just leave (..) Then you speak the same language, you have the same emotional bond. You could then easily counter radicalisation. Despite the fact that in our big world discrimination, social isolation and such are still going on. Although we have a nice policy and such; paper is patient of course. That will take a long time I think. But I think if we could just do this on an individual and group level, we could counter radicalisation. I think. [Interview J, 2015]

That is also the case when community actors need to cooperate with each other on the issue of radicalisation. When it comes to sharing emotions together, a social welfare consultant states: “Sometimes we get e-mails from partners, like Christian organisations or others, after Paris, saying like; ‘we know that it is a difficult time for you right now, we share your emotions’. That was so nice! I am 45 years old, but I found it so nice” (Interview J, 2015). Also the use of language is important when you want to maintain trust between local partners. This is underlined by a local policy advisor when he illustrates how they go about giving feedback to one another: “First you stay friendly, because you don’t want to be bossy right away, (..) but after that I will say; ‘look, I just don’t see this working out at all’.

To sum up, as a consequence of the local enactment of counter-radicalisation measures trust between community actors, members and partners can decrease. Since community actors are very much aware of the fact that trust is important for the enactment of the measures, they further underline their preventative role through various means. Most importantly, they are open and transparent towards community members and local partners about the fact that they use both community-focused and community-targeted approaches, since that will maintain a trustful relationship. Nevertheless, they do state that national partners do not fully acknowledge their role as directors, since national partners not share the amount of information necessary for community actors to do their job. This therefore undermines the feeling of trust between community actors and national partners. The feeling of trust between community actors is however not affected by the combination of community-targeted and community-focused approaches. By actively acting upon these measures to maintain trust, community actors state that the level of trust will not decrease. Trust is therefore build on a microlevel by means of personal contact.

Chapter 6 Conclusion and discussion

In this chapter an answer to the research question *'What are the effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level in the Netherlands?'* will be presented, as well as a discussion and the prospects for future research.

6.1 Summary of the findings

From 2004 onwards, a shift in counter-terrorism practices from a national to a local level took place in the Netherlands. As a result, municipalities and other community actors were responsible for the local enactment of counter-terrorism measures, and specifically for measures to counter radicalisation in which community-focused and community-targeted approaches are combined. The delegation of these seemingly contradictory policies, which can also be called the 'sugar-coating over a bitter pill', to a local level created challenges for the actors involved. First of all, due to their responsibility, community actors could label community members as outsiders, instead of treating every member of the community as an equal citizen. Moreover, due to the enactment of the counter-radicalisation policies, community actors would be able to set certain moral standards to which the members of community needed to apply. Second of all, enacting the combination of measures on a local level could lead to a feeling of inclusion and exclusion. Third of all, this combination could decrease the level of trust among community actors members and partners.

This research shows that the effects of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level are diverse and noticeable. Community actors argue that they do pay more attention to a specific part of community, namely the Muslim community as a whole. They state that they automatically link radicalisation with the Muslim community. Nevertheless, they are very much aware of this process of labelling and thus leave room for intercultural discussions and gatherings and do not set moral standards of what is 'right' and what is 'wrong'. This way, community actors believe that they are able to provide justifications for their local actions. This aligns with what Robert (2005, p. 566) depicts as managerialism in which values and ideas about the way decentralised entities could solve social issues, such as radicalisation, are central to the way community actors respond to implementation national policies. For that reason, this research partly confirms the following hypothesis: *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level are programs of remoralisation: the labelling of deviants* and concludes that counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level indeed lead to the labelling of deviants. However, community actors do not remoralise; instead, they leave room for different interpretations and discussions with community members.

Another effect of delegating counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level is the emphasis by community actors on the use of preventative measures. Since community actors acknowledge that community-targeted approaches are not part of the job description of municipalities, community actors state that they want to and need to explain more about their role as community actors who want to use preventative measures. They therefore focus their efforts on community-focused approaches which contribute to feelings of inclusion. This aligns with the statements made by Briggs, Fieschi and Lownbrough and Sliwinski (2006; p. 15; 2012, p. 297) as they explain that the combination of community-focused and community-targeted approaches will strengthen the rise of a 'self-policing society'. This way, an inclusive society is in sight. This contradicts with the statement made by Guzman (2002, p. 11), in which he states that working on the in-

crease of trust between community actors and possible actors of radicalisation would be ineffective, since: “one cannot reason with terrorists because they are constantly deploying the practice of misleading”. This is why this research not confirms the following hypothesis: *Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level cause a feeling of inclusion or exclusion within communities*’ and concludes that counter-radicalisation policies are aimed to emphasise community-focused approaches which align with feelings of inclusion.

Lastly, community actors argue that trust can be at stake when delegating counter-radicalisation policies at a local level. Because of the combination of these contradictory policies, community actors strive for the emphasis and implementation of measures which promote trust, such as direct engagement and honesty and transparency about their role as executors of both community-focused and community-targeted approaches. As a result, trust between community actors and members can be maintained.

Moreover, although community actors have a responsibility to independently increase informal social controls, the dependancy on other local and national partners is vivid. As an effect of the local enactment of counter-radicalisation policies, community actors need to collaborate with local and national partners. Community actors state that the cooperation with local partners is effective, as they also act as responsible actors amidst the execution of community-targeted and community-focused approaches. In this respect, solving social issues such as radicalisation through multi-agency partnerships is effective, as Clarke and Newman (1997, p. 24) also state.

National partners, on the other hand, still have an influence on the way counter-radicalisation policies are acted out on the local level and therefore threaten the local execution of counter-radicalisation measures. Community actors argue that national partners as the NCTV, AIVD, the National Police and the Ministry of Security and Justice withhold necessary information related to radicalisation. Therefore, their duty as being responsible actors of social control is being threatened and trust between the actors remains limited, according to the community actors. This aligns with the statement made by Hughes (2004, p. 177) where he explains that a local enactment of counter-terrorism measures could lead to ‘disappointing and chaotic outcomes of previous multi-agency partnerships’ and ‘inequalities of power, influence and knowledge between the different agencies, their positions and the institutions in which they once were inhabited’. As a result, this research partly confirms the following hypothesis ‘*Counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level lead to the breakdown of trust among communities and therefore to the inability for community actors to carry out their duties properly*’ and concludes that trust is on the one hand maintained between community actors, members and local partners. On the other hand, trust is threatened between the local actors and national partners because of a lack of information-sharing. This way, community actors state that they are unable to carry out their duties properly.

It can thus be stated that community actors are able to ventilate the importance of their role as community father and mother and that the community-focused approaches can thrive, even though community-targeted approaches are added to the curriculum of community actors. Thus, community actors acknowledge that there is a bitter pill which needs to be consumed to counter radicalisation at a local level. A sugar-coating of community-focused approaches will make it easier for them to swallow.

6.2 Discussion and future prospects

Whether community actors have a clear overview on their current enactment of their counter-radicalisation policies, the response by the community as a whole and the possible effects of that on their role, remains to be seen. Since the execution of counter-radicalisation measures are rarely new to the curriculum of local actors and most municipalities state that they have not experienced radicalisation ‘cases’, community actors argue that they are not fully experienced in the actual execution and implementation of the measures. Future research could therefore focus its efforts on the view of community actors on the actual execution, as well as on the experiences and views of the community members themselves.

Moreover, another point of discussion is whether an actual shift in crime control from the national to the local level has taken place. As Garland (2001, p. 23) argues, there has been an increase in the control of crime on a local level, whereby individual responsibility and a absence of a top-down execution of counter-terrorism measures is apparent. Nevertheless, this research shows that although community actors are indeed more responsible for controlling crime on a local level and how they go about it, their dependency on national institutions and the influence these national partners have on the actual enactment of the measures is still very much present. Whether in the near future a further withdrawal of centralised control will take place, remains to be seen.

Future research could also focus its efforts on the effects of the actual implementation of the bill regarding the extension of administrative tasks of counter terrorism for local actors. As the bill is currently still in consultation, municipalities now wonder how the bill will effect their role as community actors. Also the view of national partners on the implementation of the bill and their views on how it effects the role of community actors, is something which could be a subject for future research.

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